Merge pull request #1191 from HackTricks-wiki/update_The_Homograph_Illusion__Not_Everything_Is_As_It_Se_20250726_013005

The Homograph Illusion Not Everything Is As It Seems

src/SUMMARY.md

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
   - [Clone a Website](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/clone-a-website.md)
   - [Detecting Phishing](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/detecting-phising.md)
   - [Discord Invite Hijacking](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/discord-invite-hijacking.md)
+  - [Homograph Attacks](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/homograph-attacks.md)
   - [Mobile Phishing Malicious Apps](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/mobile-phishing-malicious-apps.md)
   - [Phishing Files & Documents](generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md)
 - [Basic Forensic Methodology](generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md)

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/README.md

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
 - **hypened subdomain**: Change the **dot for a hyphen** of a subdomain (e.g., www-zelster.com).
 - **New TLD**: Same domain using a **new TLD** (e.g., zelster.org)
 - **Homoglyph**: It **replaces** a letter in the domain name with **letters that look similar** (e.g., zelfser.com).
+
+{{#ref}}
+homograph-attacks.md
+{{#endref}}
 - **Transposition:** It **swaps two letters** within the domain name (e.g., zelsetr.com).
 - **Singularization/Pluralization**: Adds or removes “s” at the end of the domain name (e.g., zeltsers.com).
 - **Omission**: It **removes one** of the letters from the domain name (e.g., zelser.com).

src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/phishing-methodology/homograph-attacks.md

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# Homograph / Homoglyph Attacks in Phishing
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+
+## Overview
+
+A homograph (aka homoglyph) attack abuses the fact that many **Unicode code points from non-Latin scripts are visually identical or extremely similar to ASCII characters**. By replacing one or more Latin characters with their look-alike counterparts, an attacker can craft:
+
+* Display names, subjects or message bodies that look legitimate to the human eye but bypass keyword-based detections.
+* Domains, sub-domains or URL paths that fool victims into believing they are visiting a trusted site.
+
+Because every glyph is identified internally by its **Unicode code point**, a single substituted character is enough to defeat naïve string comparisons (e.g., `"Παypal.com"` vs. `"Paypal.com"`).
+
+## Typical Phishing Workflow
+
+1. **Craft message content** – Replace specific Latin letters in the impersonated brand / keyword with visually indistinguishable characters from another script (Greek, Cyrillic, Armenian, Cherokee, etc.).
+2. **Register supporting infrastructure** – Optionally register a homoglyph domain and obtain a TLS certificate (most CAs do no visual similarity checks).
+3. **Send email / SMS** – The message contains homoglyphs in one or more of the following locations:
+   * Sender display name (e.g., `Ηеlрdеѕk`)
+   * Subject line (`Urgеnt Аctіon Rеquіrеd`)
+   * Hyperlink text or fully qualified domain name
+4. **Redirect chain** – Victim is bounced through seemingly benign websites or URL shorteners before landing on the malicious host that harvests credentials / delivers malware.
+
+## Unicode Ranges Commonly Abused
+
+| Script | Range | Example glyph | Looks like |
+|--------|-------|---------------|------------|
+| Greek  | U+0370-03FF | `Η` (U+0397) | Latin `H` |
+| Greek  | U+0370-03FF | `ρ` (U+03C1) | Latin `p` |
+| Cyrillic | U+0400-04FF | `а` (U+0430) | Latin `a` |
+| Cyrillic | U+0400-04FF | `е` (U+0435) | Latin `e` |
+| Armenian | U+0530-058F | `օ` (U+0585) | Latin `o` |
+| Cherokee | U+13A0-13FF | `Ꭲ` (U+13A2) | Latin `T` |
+
+> Tip: Full Unicode charts are available at [unicode.org](https://home.unicode.org/).
+
+## Detection Techniques
+
+### 1. Mixed-Script Inspection
+
+Phishing emails aimed at an English-speaking organisation should rarely mix characters from multiple scripts.  A simple but effective heuristic is to:
+
+1. Iterate each character of the inspected string.
+2. Map the code point to its Unicode block.
+3. Raise an alert if more than one script is present **or** if non-Latin scripts appear where they are not expected (display name, domain, subject, URL, etc.).
+
+Python proof-of-concept:
+
+```python
+import unicodedata as ud
+from collections import defaultdict
+
+SUSPECT_FIELDS = {
+    "display_name": "Ηоmоgraph Illusion",     # example data
+    "subject": "Finаnꮯiаl Տtatеmеnt",
+    "url": "https://xn--messageconnecton-2kb.blob.core.windows.net"  # punycode
+}
+
+for field, value in SUSPECT_FIELDS.items():
+    blocks = defaultdict(int)
+    for ch in value:
+        if ch.isascii():
+            blocks['Latin'] += 1
+        else:
+            name = ud.name(ch, 'UNKNOWN')
+            block = name.split(' ')[0]     # e.g., 'CYRILLIC'
+            blocks[block] += 1
+    if len(blocks) > 1:
+        print(f"[!] Mixed scripts in {field}: {dict(blocks)} -> {value}")
+```
+
+### 2. Punycode Normalisation (Domains)
+
+Internationalised Domain Names (IDNs) are encoded with **punycode** (`xn--`). Converting every hostname to punycode and then back to Unicode allows matching against a whitelist or performing similarity checks (e.g., Levenshtein distance) **after** the string has been normalised.
+
+```python
+import idna
+hostname = "Ρаypal.com"   # Greek Rho + Cyrillic a
+puny = idna.encode(hostname).decode()
+print(puny)  # xn--yl8hpyal.com
+```
+
+### 3. Homoglyph Dictionaries / Algorithms
+
+Tools such as **dnstwist** (`--homoglyph`) or **urlcrazy** can enumerate visually-similar domain permutations and are useful for proactive takedown / monitoring.
+
+## Prevention & Mitigation
+
+* Enforce strict DMARC/DKIM/SPF policies – prevent spoofing from unauthorised domains.
+* Implement the detection logic above in **Secure Email Gateways** and **SIEM/XSOAR** playbooks.
+* Flag or quarantine messages where display name domain ≠ sender domain.
+* Educate users: copy-paste suspicious text into a Unicode inspector, hover links, never trust URL shorteners.
+
+## Real-World Examples
+
+* Display name: `Сonfidеntiаl Ꭲiꮯkеt` (Cyrillic `С`, `е`, `а`; Cherokee `Ꭲ`; Latin small capital `ꮯ`).
+* Domain chain: `bestseoservices.com` ➜ municipal `/templates` directory ➜ `kig.skyvaulyt.ru` ➜ fake Microsoft login at `mlcorsftpsswddprotcct.approaches.it.com` protected by custom OTP CAPTCHA.
+* Spotify impersonation: `Sρօtifս` sender with link hidden behind `redirects.ca`.
+
+These samples originate from Unit 42 research (July 2025) and illustrate how homograph abuse is combined with URL redirection and CAPTCHA evasion to bypass automated analysis.
+
+## References
+
+- [The Homograph Illusion: Not Everything Is As It Seems](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/homograph-attacks/)
+- [Unicode Character Database](https://home.unicode.org/)  
+- [dnstwist – domain permutation engine](https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist)
+
+{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}